Malaysia ranks among the most unequal countries in the world when it comes to electoral boundaries. According to the 2024 Electoral Integrity Global Report, which assesses the fairness of countries’ electoral systems, Malaysia received a dismal score of 58 out of 100, with electoral boundaries scoring 31 and political financing just 24. These poor ratings stem from systemic manipulation of the electoral process, rooted in the long-standing control of the Election Commission (EC) by the Executive branch. While the EC is established as an independent body under Article 113 of the Federal Constitution, it lacks genuine autonomy due to its financial dependence on the federal government and an appointment process that places control in the hands of the Prime Minister, who recommends candidates to the King without formal vetting or public scrutiny.
Over the decades, this centralisation of control has allowed for deliberate malapportionment and gerrymandering, practices that have distorted democratic representation and eroded public trust in Malaysia’s elections.
Malapportionment: Grossly Different Sizes
One of the most blatant issues plaguing Malaysia’s electoral landscape is malapportionment—the creation of constituencies with vastly unequal numbers of voters. Originally, the Federal Constitution allowed only a 15% variation in constituency sizes within a state. However, constitutional amendments in 1962 and 1973 progressively dismantled these safeguards, replacing clear limits with vague language such as “approximately equal.” This opened the door for the EC, under Executive influence, to create its own classification system for constituencies—metropolitan, town, semi-urban, semi-rural, and rural—each with its own acceptable size variation, some stretching up to 30%.
As a result, intra-state malapportionment reached alarming levels. After the 2018 review of electoral boundaries, the Selangor constituency of Bangi was left with 150,439 voters, while Sabak Bernam in the same state had only 37,126—smaller by a ratio of more than 4 to 1. By the 15th General Election in 2022 when Undi18 and Automatic Voters registration (AVR) where implemented, Bangi’s voter count had risen to over 303,000, while Sabak Bernam had only 51,600, producing disparities as high as 5.6 to 1 within a single state.
Inter-state malapportionment presents an equally serious issue. Following the 1962 constitutional amendment, the power to determine the number of constituencies in each state was transferred from the EC to Parliament. This change was originally intended to accommodate the formation of Malaysia with Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak in 1963. However, it soon became a political tool. The ruling coalition consistently underrepresented opposition or swing states like Selangor and Kelantan while giving disproportionate representation to stronghold states such as Johor, Pahang, and Perak.
This imbalance results in extreme disparities in voter power. In 2022, the constituency of Bangi had more than 303,000 voters, while Igan in Sarawak had just 28,290. One vote in Igan thus carried the weight of nearly eleven votes in Bangi. These injustices have persisted despite shifting political tides, and while the ruling coalition’s carefully crafted advantage was upended in the 2018 general election, the underlying mechanisms that allowed such manipulation remain intact.
Gerrymandering: Drawing Lines to Win
The manipulation of electoral boundaries by drawing boundaries to favour specific parties, known as gerrymandering, has been another tool used to tilt elections. Section 2(d) of the 13th Schedule of the Federal Constitution emphasises the importance of maintaining “local ties” when altering constituencies. Yet, this safeguard has routinely been violated.
For example, in Selangor’s 2016 redelineation, despite only modest changes in voter numbers, the EC redrew boundaries to convert 16 ethnically mixed constituencies into 13 Malay-majority and three Chinese-majority seats. The then Chairman of the EC openly admitted that ethnic composition was a guiding factor in drawing these new boundaries, in apparent defiance of constitutional principles.
Statistical analysis supports these claims. While Malays made up 65.8% of the population in Peninsular Malaysia, they were the majority or plurality in over 80% of parliamentary constituencies. In contrast, Chinese citizens, comprising nearly a quarter of the population, held majorities in less than 20% of constituencies. Indians and other minority groups had no constituencies where they were the majority. This over-representation of Malays by nearly 15% and under-representation of others by similar margins is a direct result of deliberate boundary manipulation. This incentivises racial politics, motivating political contenders to play on the insecurities of the Malay community to win votes.
Moreover, the redrawing of boundaries has frequently ignored administrative divisions such as district and local authority borders—key components of “local ties.” This has led to irregularly shaped constituencies that span multiple local authorities. For example, the Subang and Kelana Jaya parliamentary constituencies both encompass three different local councils. A particularly egregious case is Santubong in Sarawak, a dragon-shaped constituency that crosses four administrative zones, including metropolitan, city, town, and rural areas, creating not only an administrative nightmare but also serving as a visual metaphor in itself.
Legislative Undermining of Electoral Integrity
Malaysia’s electoral manipulation has been facilitated by successive legal amendments that stripped the EC of its autonomy and eroded safeguards against unfair delineation. In 1962, the 13th Schedule was introduced, allowing rural constituencies to have significantly smaller electorates. The same year, Article 46 was amended to fix the number of seats per state regardless of population, enabling the under-representation of states like Singapore and over-representation of Sabah and Sarawak. In 1973, further amendments removed any cap on variation within a state, transferring full authority to Parliament to approve boundary changes, effectively sidelining the EC. In 1984, a final blow came with the removal of the 10-year maximum interval between redelineations, granting the EC—and by extension the ruling party—greater flexibility to time redelineations strategically.
Together, these changes created a system in which politicians, not impartial institutions, could engineer the electoral map to their advantage.
The Politicised Election Commission
The EC is tasked with conducting elections, managing voter registration, and drawing electoral boundaries. Yet it operates under the influence of the Prime Minister, who unilaterally advises the King on commissioner appointments. This creates a fundamental conflict of interest: the party in power controls the body that determines how and when elections are run and how constituencies are shaped.
Although professional integrity could, in theory, prevail even under a flawed system, the appointment process makes this highly unlikely. Without transparency and checks on executive power, the EC remains susceptible to political manipulation.
Proposals for Reform
Addressing these deep-rooted problems requires a comprehensive legal and institutional overhaul. First, Malaysia must strengthen its legal framework. This can be achieved by amending the 13th Schedule of the Constitution or, if that proves too difficult, by enacting a Constituency Delimitation Act (CDA). Such legislation should restore a strict cap on constituency size deviations—ideally plus or minus 10 percent from the state average—and establish a clear definition of “local ties.” This definition should require that state constituencies fall within a single local authority and that federal constituencies do not span more than two local authorities. Additionally, the public objection period during redelineation should be extended from 30 to 60 days, with all relevant data made freely accessible. When objections are rejected, the EC must provide justifications and allow objectors the opportunity to be heard. Furthermore, the maximum period between redelineations should be reinstated at 10 years, with the EC or a new, independent commission holding final authority over boundary changes—not Parliament or the Prime Minister.
Second, Malaysia should establish a separate, independent body to oversee boundary delineation. Countries like Canada, India, and the UK provide strong models, with bodies such as the Delimitation Commission of India or the UK’s Boundary Commissions. A Malaysian equivalent could function on an ad hoc basis, activated two or three years before each redelineation cycle. This would allow for specialisation and impartiality, free from the distractions and conflicts of running elections. Administrative support could still be provided by the EC, but the redelineation process would be managed by an independent body with a singular focus on fair boundaries.
Finally, the appointment process for EC commissioners must be reformed. Leaving such critical decisions to the sole discretion of the Prime Minister is both undemocratic and dangerous. Instead, there should be an open call for nominations, followed by a shortlisting process conducted by a Nomination Committee. The shortlist would be vetted by the Parliamentary Special Select Committee (PSSC) on Human Rights, Institutional Reform and Elections, which would recommend two or three candidates to the Prime Minister. Only then would the Prime Minister advise the King on a final appointment. While such a process could be adopted administratively, it should ultimately be institutionalised through a constitutional amendment to Article 114.
Conclusion
Malaysia’s electoral boundaries remain among the most biased globally due to decades of political manipulation, legal erosion, and a compromised EC. If the country is to uphold democratic principles, it must urgently reform its electoral laws, create an independent body to oversee constituency delineation, and establish a transparent, bipartisan process for appointing election commissioners. Only then can Malaysians enjoy fair representation and renewed trust in the electoral system. With political will and strong public engagement, a more just and equitable democracy is possible.
Author
Thomas Fann
