Introduction
A wave of disappointment swept through voters and the coalition as GRS announced it would collaborate with UMNO-BN 6, Independent 5, UPKO 3, STAR 2, PKDM 1, and PKR-PH 1 to form a new state government. The decision was widely perceived as a betrayal of local party sentiment, with many interpreting the move as a calculated political maneuver rather than a genuine pursuit of regional interests. Was this a desperate sacrifice of principle for power, turning the ‘speed of consensus’ into a source of deep public resentment? This reflects a recurring pattern in Sabah’s coalition politics, where post-election realignments routinely trump voter intent, entrenching public cynicism toward democratic competition. More critically, the move appeared to hollow out the long-invoked slogan of “Sabah for Sabahans”, reducing it from a substantive political commitment into a rhetorical device mobilised during campaigns but readily set aside in the calculus of post-election power-sharing.
The proposed alliance with Umno sparked widespread dissent within GRS, with many viewing the reconciliation as a betrayal of political integrity following the ‘Kinabalu Move’ tensions. The reaction was not intended as a rejection of the national parties themselves, as GRS has always been open to federal cooperation (in fact, it cooperates with PH), but rather a silent protest against certain partners seen as antagonists. The resulting internal friction prompted some figures to retreat into a “political hiatus,” as they were unable to reconcile pragmatic considerations with their prior political commitments.
Nevertheless, many observers failed to recognise that the 17th Sabah State Election saw no single bloc secure a simple majority mandate in 37 (out of 73) contested seats. This resulted in a hung state assembly, a scenario similar to Malaysia’s 15th General Election (GE15) in 2022. When the results were counted on 29 November 2025, GRS won 29 seats, while Warisan followed with 25. As a result, the only solution was to form a unity government. Forming a government became a high-risk process of political bargaining due to the seat-number deadlock. It was all about ‘who moved first’ to bridge the 8-seat gap. The partnership with UMNO was a calculated compromise aimed at securing state stability and blunting the momentum of rival coalitions.
Under Article 6(3) of the Sabah State Constitution, the appointment of the Chief Minister depends on a simple majority. Article 160 of the Federal Constitution clearly states that a “political party” may be either an organisation or a combination of registered organisations. An important point to highlight is that Article 6(7) of the previously repealed Sabah State Constitution is conceptually subject to the main requirement of Article 6(3). The party that obtains the most seats remains the government if it fails to obtain a simple majority (at least 37 out of 73 seats). Political events in 2020, following the 2020 Sabah State Election (16th Sabah General Election), saw attempts to question the legitimacy of the government formed because its party obtained the most seats and attempted to set aside Article 6(3). Therefore, the repeal of Article 6(7) is legally justified as it removes ambiguity and reaffirms the requirement of a majority mandate.
It is also worth noting a new political trend that was rarely observed before 2018: the use of a Statutory Declaration (SD) to establish a simple majority. This did not happen before because, looking at the country’s political history, the political landscape was dominated by Barisan Nasional (BN) until GE14 (2018), even though in 2008 (GE12), BN lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority.
Seat Distribution and Bargaining Politics Between Parties
The negotiations for the 17th Sabah State Election (PRN17) were characterised by a complex web of alliances. Pakatan Harapan (PH) partnered with two blocs that could not work together, leading to it being dubbed “main dua kolam” (playing both sides) or “cinta tiga segi” (triangular affair). Tensions between Barisan Nasional (BN) and Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) have continued for more than two years after a failed coup attempt.
Voices within GRS itself wanting to go solo saw the talks of collaboration with PH lead to STAR and SAPP leaving the local party coalition. PKR’s demand for more than the two traditional seats won in the previous election clearly created tension, prompting STAR and SAPP to leave GRS. In contrast, DAP took a more pragmatic approach, focusing its demands on urban strongholds to protect the incumbents. What many do not know is that there were negotiations and understandings between GRS and PH, as they had made an early assessment that BN would not field candidates in seats contested by PH.
Political power trading ultimately led to GRS contesting 55 seats, PH 22, BN 45, and PN 42. STAR and SAPP, which had split from GRS, contested 46 and 6 seats respectively. KDM contested 40 seats, while Parti Impian Sabah aimed for 72 seats, making it the most aggressive new party. Warisan contested all 73 seats. At the outset of negotiations, PH was also advised to contest under the GRS logo, given the rising sentiment in favour of local parties. However, this proposal did not materialise, as national parties remained confident in their own strength and less persuaded by that sentiment. However, this proposal did not materialise, or else the outcome of the election might have been different.
One key lesson for GRS in the seat distribution issue here is the mistake of handing over all the urban areas under the Kota Kinabalu, Sandakan and Tawau parliamentary constituencies to DAP. Although there is no regulation from the EC that explicitly states that candidates or parties not contesting in a given area cannot display their campaign materials, Section 24B of the Election Offences Act 1954 (Act 5) requires contesting candidates or their agents to pay a fee and obtain a permit to display campaign materials. This rule has previously led to images of politicians on election billboards being cut out or removed by the EC. Since out-of-area voters predominantly live in increasingly densely populated urban areas due to migration and urbanisation, they are at a disadvantage, as they are less likely to encounter campaign materials that could influence their voting. By the time they return to their hometowns to vote, they are usually already committed to their support.
Impact of Malayan-Centric Narratives on Sabahan Electorate Dignity
Digital platforms, particularly the rise of homeless media, have played a significant role in shaping electoral behaviour in Sabah, although their impact has been uneven across communities. Voters with stable digital access are often influenced by social media, while those trapped in “digital poverty” still need traditional campaigning that reaches them in person. Many individuals with lower levels of digital media literacy are often unaware of how platform algorithms shape the content they see, which can gradually trap them within echo chambers. These algorithms prioritise information that aligns with users’ past behaviours and preferences, reinforcing repeated exposure to similar views while limiting encounters with alternative perspectives.
The rise of local party sentiment among many KDMR voters is not accidental but driven by identifiable underlying factors, as social science emphasises cause-and-effect relationships. The 17th Sabah State Election (PRN17) campaign was marred by a series of rhetorical errors that heightened the friction between the Federal and State identities. Several prominent “hot button” incidents have acted as triggers, leading the electorate to shift towards local parties to fight for state autonomy and resolve long-standing grievances.
Fiscal Federalism and the 40% Revenue Entitlement Issue
The main issue remains the 40% net revenue entitlement owed to Sabah under Articles 112C and 112D of the Federal Constitution. The Court of Appeal recently upheld a High Court decision granting the Sabah Law Society (SLS) permission to pursue a judicial review against the Federal Government concerning this mandatory refund. Public discourse intensified after a walkabout in Kota Kinabalu, where a response to citizens’ questions was widely condemned as dismissive.
The situation reached a boiling point when it was revealed that, while the Federal Government initially aimed to challenge the SLS’s standing, its subsequent legal manoeuvres were seen as inconsistent. This perceived lack of transparency led many Sabahans to conclude that the federal leadership, often viewed through the lens of “Malayan” political hegemony, was insincere and trying to bypass constitutional obligations through tactical delays.
Political Communication and Public Perception: A Case Study
Earlier, Sabahans were shocked by the Gardenia bread controversy sparked by a Malayan leader, who claimed that winning Sabahan votes was as easy as giving them Gardenia bread. The Gardenia bread controversy has indeed had a very negative impact on all PN candidates contesting in the 17th general election. The comment by a PAS politician was widely seen as disrespectful and disrespectful, sparking a significant public backlash. PN’s opponents have also exploited the episode to question PN’s sensitivity towards Sabahan voters, framing the statement as evidence of a lack of understanding of local realities. What began as a statement quickly became a broader symbol of perceived political condescension, reinforcing long-standing concerns about ‘Malayan paternalism’ by effectively signalling to voters that the federal leadership was still fundamentally disconnected from the socio-economic realities of the Borneo states. As a result, the incident became a powerful regional rallying point, transforming a loaf of bread into a potent symbol of statewide resistance to the perceived subservience of the federation.
Debates on Federal–State Relations and Secession Discourse
A former law minister, in a podcast (12 November 2025), raised a hypothetical argument suggesting that dissatisfaction in Sabah regarding MA63, or the 40 per cent revenue-sharing arrangement, might warrant a reassessment of its relationship with the federation, citing Singapore as a historical reference. He argued that fulfilling the 40% revenue entitlement would “bankrupt” the federal government (Malaya) and proposed that MA63 should be “cancelled” because it was “unfair” to the Peninsula. He added that they should be “allowed to go” (merdekakan) or seek independence, comparing the situation to Singapore’s 1965 exit. This has become a major flashpoint in the lead-up to the 17th Sabah State Election (PRN17).
Constitutional Status of Sabah and Sarawak in Federal Governance
This sense of alienation was further worsened by a controversial parliamentary reply from the Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department (Law and Institutional Reform), who stated that Sabah and Sarawak were classified as ‘states’ based on a literal interpretation of Hansard 1963 and the original text of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). This interpretation was viewed as a significant step backwards, as it appeared to ignore the spirit of the 2022 Amendment to Article 1(2) of the Federal Constitution. The landmark amendment was specifically intended to restore Sabah and Sarawak’s status as ‘equal partners’ with the States of Malaya, moving away from the 1976 classification that had reduced them to just two of thirteen states.
The ‘One State’ narrative is viewed by Borneo observers as a failure to recognise this hard-earned constitutional acknowledgement of equal sharing. These incidents collectively strengthened the perception of ‘Malayan colonialism’, effectively increasing localist sentiment and hardening voters’ determination to defend Sabah’s constitutional sovereignty. Tensions peaked in early 2026 when the same Minister suggested that MA63 did not include provisions on oil and gas ownership. This prompted the Sabah Chief Minister to formally challenge the claim, dismissing it as the view of ‘certain parties’ rather than Federal consensus, and reaffirming that Sabah’s rights to its natural resources remain subjects of active negotiations and are non-negotiable.
Discussion: Emerging Regional Political Identity and Governance Implications
One unique point that could be further analysed is the significantly different patterns of online community responses across platforms. This opens up space for further research on user-generated content (UGC), where the same issue can exhibit different patterns of engagement, framing, and emotional tone when discussed in different languages (English, Malay, or Chinese (Mandarin). This variation is not only reflected in the choice of words and narratives used but also in the types of arguments emphasized and the intensity of reactions expressed. In this sense, language-based platforms can indirectly shape how political issues are viewed and negotiated, revealing fundamental differences in social norms, collective memory, and media literacy among users operating in different linguistic environments.
The results of the 17th Sabah State Election (PRN17) obviously mark a definitive shift in the centre of gravity for Malaysian federalism, moving away from Peninsular-centric dominance towards a hardened regionalist identity. Far from an overnight shift, this ‘Bornean Awakening’ emerged in response to federal overreach, fuelled by dismissive political rhetoric and a perceived constitutional regression. The perceived disconnect of Peninsular leaders catalyzed a ‘Sabah First’ movement, signaling a public weary of federal indifference toward Sabah’s pursuit of its hard-won status as an equal partner under the amended Constitution.
For the grassroots electorate, these constitutional debates are deeply connected to the “Triple” infrastructure crisis, the ongoing failure of water, electricity, and road connectivity. The 40% revenue entitlement is not just a legal formality to the average Sabahan; it is seen as the main financial mechanism through which these persistent socio-economic issues can ultimately be addressed. When federal officials described these binding international agreements as “charitable burdens” or implied that dissatisfaction should result in a “Singapore-style exit,” they erected a “moral barrier” between the centre and the periphery. This disconnection made the eventual 2025 political alliances feel like a betrayal of the campaign’s spirit, as voters grappled with the mental discomfort or cognitive dissonance of witnessing their leaders collaborate with the very entities that had undermined their regional struggle.
Ultimately, the unique political culture of Sabah has developed to punish such perceived paternalism. While political elites may have hoped the “Kinabalu Move” (the 2023 attempt to remove the state leadership) had faded from memory, the grassroots remain sharply aware of the “Langkah” politics that prioritise power over constitutional duty. This environment has turned even the smallest issue into a negligible factor; in the age of viral social media, even a loaf of bread can spark a landslide. The “cause” of Peninsular leaders’ stereotyping of Sabahans as poor and easily satisfied has produced its “effect”: a sharp rise in autonomy-seeking sentiment that rejects “foreign” political interference. As Sabah enters this new era, the lesson for Putrajaya is clear, respect for Bornean dignity and a sincere commitment to MA63 are no longer optional “political gestures,” but the essential minimum requirements for national stability.
Conclusion: Policy Implications for Governance and Federal–State Relations
The 17th Sabah State Election (PRN17) exemplifies the ‘Borneo Awakening,’ a movement in which contentious political discourse from Peninsular leaders and grievances over Sabah’s constitutional rights have fundamentally reshaped the state’s political landscape. The dominance of national parties has given way to local parties. The rise of local parties reflects a strengthening regional identity, spurred by perceptions of Peninsular hegemony. This is exemplified by notable lapses in cultural diplomacy and a framework that treats Sabah as a subordinate state rather than an equal partner. Against the backdrop of the ‘Triple’ infrastructure crisis, these events shifted the 40% revenue entitlement from a legal debate into a fundamental socio-economic priority for the Sabahan public. In the end, the election underscores a fundamental divergence between grassroots expectations and the political establishment, with voters prioritizing a stronger emphasis on regional representation and local priorities over perceived federal-centric management to seek a genuine reset of the federal-state relationship.
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Author
Assoc Prof Dr Lee Kuok Tiung
